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XU VS. THE HOSPITAL AND HIS GUARDIAN –  






China’s first Mental Health Law (hereinafter, MHL) came into force on 1 May, 2013. It 
was praised as a landmark for rights protection of persons with mental disabilities in 
China1. The MHL reflects typical “rights-based” mental health legislation, in which 
involuntary inpatient treatment2 is only permitted when a person with severe mental 
disorder is seen to pose a risk of harm to self or others.3 Compared with the municipal 
mental health regulations before the MHL, it is believed to introduce a higher threshold 
for involuntary inpatient treatment.4 For example, under the Shanghai Municipal 
Mental Health Regulation (before being amended according to the MHL), a person 
with mental disorder can be involuntarily committed and treated if he or she were 
regarded as lacking insight and in need of treatment.5 Because of the gap between 
the threshold of involuntary inpatient treatment before and after the MHL, it was 
commonly believed that many people involuntarily hospitalised would be discharged 
after MHL’s entry into force. For example, Yongqiang Lin predicted that in Guangdong 
Province, 90% of patients currently hospitalised would leave hospital because they 
would not meet the new criteria.6 It is now two years since the coming into force of the 
MHL, and no evidence is observed that those patients in Lin’s prediction can be 
successfully discharged. An explanation as to why this is the case may be offered by 
the case of Mr. Xu,7 a man who unsuccessfully sued both his appointed guardian and 
the hospital that sought his involuntary hospitalisation, claiming that his right to liberty 
had been denied.8 
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Law 669. 
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Archives of Psychiatry 305. 
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Based on the search on China Judgments Online9, the official website for open 
judgments operated by the Supreme People's Court of the People's Republic of China, 
Xu’s is the first case that a hospitalised person sued for his discharge under the MHL. 
As will be argued in this case note, Xu’s failure suggests that the MHL needs stronger 
safeguarding measures, such as independent review body and periodic re-evaluation, 
to achieve its rights-protecting purpose. It can be also argued, through Xu’s case, that 
the change in criteria for involuntary inpatient treatment would not result in the 
discharge of patients who no longer satisfy the criteria unless the court adopts an 
explicit approach in identifying whether a patient has the capacity to “complete hospital 
discharge procedures” in Article 45. In addition, the case of Xu raises concerns about 
whether the law and practice in China is compliant with the UN Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (hereinafter, CRPD), which China ratified on 26 
June 2008. It is outside of the scope of this case note to provide a detailed analysis of 
the tensions between the MHL and China’s obligations under the CRPD, nonetheless 
Xu’s case offers some insights into the potential implications of the CRPD in the way 
the MHL is operating. 
 
It is worth noting that, unlike most mental health laws or legislation in common law 
jurisdictions that focus on authorising and regulating involuntary commitment and 
treatment, the MHL covers broader issues including promotion of psychological well-
being and prevention of mental disorder (Chapter II), diagnosis and treatment of 
mental disorders (Chapter III), rehabilitation of mental disorders (Chapter IV), and 
measures necessary to implement the law such as financial input (Chapter V). Among 
them, Article 21, which states “… if it appears that a family member may have a mental 
disorder, other family members shall help them obtain prompt medical care, provide 
for their daily needs, and assume responsibility for their supervision and 
management”, reaffirms family responsibility for the care of people with mental 
disorders. The family’s total responsibility and access to community-based support are 
important factors in this case, as well as in many other cases, but this case note only 
addresses the provisions on inpatient treatment and discharge that are applied in the 
court’s decision. 
 
This case note will present the case of Xu with a view to examining the operation of 
the MHL in Chinese courts. The following two sections will look at the facts and the 
decision in this case. The fourth section will then discuss the interpretation and 
application of the MHL in Xu’s case and provide some insights from the perspective of 
the CRPD. The case note concludes with a brief summary of the main points of the 







                                                          
then settled through an assessment of Xu’s capacity to litigate. An analysis on this issue, see Bo Chen, 
‘Right to Litigate of Persons with Psychosocial Disabilities in China: From Mental Health Law to the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’, Disability Rights Study in China 2015 (Social 
Science Academic Press, Beijing 2015). 
9 http://www.court.gov.cn/zgcpwsw/, accessed on 1 February 2016. 





Xu is a male Chinese citizen who was born in the 1960s. Xu was hospitalised by a 
mental hospital in Shanghai in the December of 2001 for the first time. His second 
involuntary inpatient treatment, which continues at the time of writing, commenced on 
12 July 2003.10 
 
Prior to his hospitalisation, Xu lived in Australia between 1989 and 2000. According to 
the medical record provided to the court, Xu had been diagnosed with mental disorder 
in 1997 and become unemployed, “ill-tempered for no reason”11, depressed, and was 
gambling. Xu was repatriated by the Australian government in 2000. After repatriation 
to China, he insisted on returning to Australia and it was reported that he had behaved 
dangerously towards others. The report indicates that his first hospitalisation following 
repatriation was committed by the Mental Health Centre in Putuo District in December 
2001, where he was diagnosed with schizophrenia. He was prescribed 
Chlorpromazine and the medical record described the administration of the drug as 
“very effective”. But when he stopped the medication after leaving the hospital, his 
condition deteriorated. He started to refuse food and suspected that the food was 
poisoned by his family. Two weeks before his second hospitalisation, his condition 
became much worse. The report also recorded that he had broken his father’s nose in 
a conflict. This was also the trigger for this hospitalisation to the Shanghai Qingchun 
Mental Health Rehabilitation Hospital (hereinafter, the hospital).12 
 
The information above, which was recorded in Xu’s medical report, was accepted by 
the court and quoted in the judgment. 
 
In the second half of 2008, Xu’s father passed away and his older brother was 
appointed as his guardian by the neighbourhood committee in the place of his 
residence (hereafter, neighbourhood committee).13 
 
                                                          
10 His commitment was facilitated by his father who signed the consent form. Xu vs. the Hospital and 
his Guardian – Involuntary Inpatient Treatment, p. 1 
11 This term “ill-tempered for no reason” is translated by Author from “无故发脾气”, a piece of description 
on the medical record and quoted by the judgment. See Xu vs. the Hospital and his Guardian – 
Involuntary Inpatient Treatment, p. 1. 
12 Xu vs. the Hospital and his Guardian – Involuntary Inpatient Treatment, p. 1. 
13 No information on how or why the older brother was appointed as Xu’s guardian is given in the 
judgment. However, it is a tradition in China that the older brothers and sisters are expected to play the 
role of parent if the father or mother is unavailable. The appointment of guardian for adults with 
no/limited capacity for civil conduct is addressed in Article 17 of General Principles of the Civil Law of 
the People's Republic of China (hereinafter, GPCL): A person from the following categories shall act as 
guardian for a mentally ill person without or with limited capacity for civil conduct: (1) spouse; (2) parent; 
(3) adult child; (4) any other near relative; (5) any other closely connected relative or friend willing to 
bear the responsibility of guardianship and having approval from the unit to which the mentally ill person 
belongs or from the neighbourhood or village committee in the place of his residence. In case of a 
dispute over guardianship, the unit to which the mentally ill person belongs or the neighbourhood or 
village committee in the place of his residence shall appoint a guardian from among his near relatives. 
If disagreement over the appointment leads to a lawsuit, the people's court shall make a ruling. If none 
of the persons listed in the first paragraph of this article is available to be the guardian, the unit to which 
the mentally ill person belongs, the neighbourhood or village committee in the place of his residence or 
the civil affairs department shall act as his guardian. 
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Xu requested the hospital to permit him to leave a number of times. On 7 April 2011, 
the hospital approached Xu’s older brother and informed him that the hospital wanted 
him to take Xu out, because Xu had already been detained in the hospital for eight 
years. The hospital also had concerns about the fact that Xu attempted to escape 
once.14 The older brother, however, “begged” the hospital to keep Xu committed 
because he said he could not handle the caring of and monitoring of Xu. The older 
brother also declared that “if something bad happens during the hospitalisation, I will 
take the full responsibility and have no claim to the hospital.”15 Xu did not regain his 
liberty because his older brother refused to take him out. Later on, Xu made a 
complaint to the local committee of his neighbourhood about his hospitalisation. The 
local committee tried to negotiate with his older brother, but it failed again.16 
 
In order to leave the hospital, Xu asked his mother to replace his older brother as his 
guardian. In 2012, his mother raised the motion on the ground that the older brother 
failed to fulfil the duty of a guardian. She claimed that the older brother worked in 
another province and paid no attention to Xu. Although Xu’s mother expressed her 
willingness to act as the guardian and Xu favoured it too, the court held that, given her 
age, housing condition and low income, his mother lacked the ability to provide care. 
The court also held that the older brother fulfilled his duties as a guardian. In this case, 
the court instructed a research institution on forensic examination to carry out an 
examination in which Xu was found with residual schizophrenia and with limited 
capacity for civil conducts.17 
 
Having failed in all the attempts to leave, Xu sued the hospital and his older brother 
for jointly violating his right to personal liberty on 6 May 2013, five days after the entry 
into force of MHL. Xu had three claims in this case: a. acknowledgment that his right 
to liberty was violated by the hospital and his older brother; b. an immediate end to the 
deprivation of his liberty; and c. compensation to be paid by the hospital and his older 
brother amounting to 10,000 RMB (approximately 1,500 euros).18 
 
Because of the administrative rules of the hospital, Xu could not leave the hospital to 
personally lodge his claim. However, following lodgement by his representing lawyer, 
the court immediately refused to accept the case because the court thought Xu was 
incapable of litigating. After a number of rounds of negotiation and communication, 
and a specific assessment of Xu’s capacity to litigate, the case was deemed 
admissible by the court.19 The first hearing took place five months after the date the 
                                                          
14 The judgment provides no further reason for why the hospital wanted Xu’s older brother to take Xu 
out. But it quoted from Xu’s forensic examination report that Xu was assessed “with residual 
schizophrenia” and “in remission of symptom” in 2012. 
15 Xu vs. the Hospital and his Guardian – Involuntary Inpatient Treatment, p. 2. 
16 Ibid, p. 1-2. 
17 Capacity for Civil Conduct is a legal term in the GPCL. It has a similar meaning as legal capacity to 
exercise rights in civil affairs, or decision-making capacity in common law traditions. Article 13 of GPCL 
states: “[a] mentally ill person who is unable to account for his own conduct shall be a person having 
no capacity for civil conduct and shall be represented in civil activities by his agent ad litem. A mentally 
ill person who is unable to fully account for his own conduct shall be a person with limited capacity for 
civil conduct and may engage in civil activities appropriate to his mental health; in other civil activities, 
he shall be represented by his agent ad litem or participate with the consent of his agent ad litem.” And 
Article 14 states: “[t]he guardian of a person without or with limited capacity for civil conduct shall be his 
agent ad litem.” 
18 Xu vs. the Hospital and his Guardian – Involuntary Inpatient Treatment, p. 3. 
19 Ibid, p. 2-3. 
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claim was submitted. Xu claimed that he had recovered from his mental health 
problem but the hospital refused to release him because his guardian refused to take 
him out. Xu pointed out the fact, again, that his older brother was working in another 
province, did nothing for him and had no intention of fulfilling his duty of guardianship. 
Xu also noted in his claim that his older brother occupied an apartment under his name 
and took the rent. 
 
Xu’s older brother did not attend the hearings. The hospital submitted to the court that 
they made their best effort to allow Xu leave. They contacted his older brother many 
times, but his older brother repeatedly refused to consent to his release. They also 
argued that the “principle of voluntary inpatient treatment” did not apply to Xu, because 
he was involuntarily hospitalised in 2003. 
 
Before giving the judgment, the court contacted Xu’s mother, the older brother, Xu’s 
other brother and the director of the neighbourhood committee20 for their opinions. 
Although his mother wanted Xu to leave, she could not bear the actual responsibility 
for Xu’s daily life. The other three agreed that keeping Xu in the hospital was the best 
option, while the older brother also expressed his willingness to take Xu out when he 




The court of first instance recognised the result of the assessment in the previous 
guardian-replacement case that Xu was a person with limited capacity for civil 
conducts. Also, in the forensic examination to determine Xu’s capacity to litigate, Xu 
was found not to have fully recovered from his mental health problem. Based on these 
assessments, the court of first instance held that Xu’s status of limited capacity to civil 
conduct remained and the guardian should be in place for activities outside the scope 
of his ability. 
 
The court held that Xu’s older brother fulfilled his duty as a guardian22 by putting Xu in 
the hospital. The court acknowledged that keeping Xu in the hospital was the best 
choice that the older brother could make. The court pointed out, in particular, that along 
with the guardian’s duty, “a guardian also enjoys the right to choose reasonable 
method of fulfilling the guardianship.”23 
 
                                                          
20 The neighbourhood committee is not a branch of government but bears some local administrative 
duties, mediating conflicts between residents for example. In the matter of this case, the neighbourhood 
committee also holds the right to appoint guardians based on Article 17 of the GPCL. 
21 Xu vs. the Hospital and his Guardian – Involuntary Inpatient Treatment, p. 4. 
22 In this case, Xu’s older brother’s role of guardian was legally recognised by the court in the previous 
guardian-replacement case. Generally, the appointment of guardians is covered by the GPCL in 
conjunction with the Civil Procedure Law of People’s Republic of China on identifying a person with 
no/limited capacity to civil conduct. However, the MHL sets that “guardians for mentally disordered 
patients are to be those eligible under the provisions of GPCL”. For a discussion on this, see X. Zhao 
and J. Dawson, ‘The New Chinese Mental Health Law’ (2014) 21 Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 669, 
680. 
23 Xu vs. the Hospital and his Guardian – Involuntary Inpatient Treatment, p. 1. It is also addressed by 
Article 18 of the GPCL that “A guardian's rights to fulfil his guardianship in accordance with the law shall 
be protected by law”. 
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The court also held that the Article 44 of MHL, which states “[p]ersons with mental 
disorders who are voluntarily admitted to the hospital may request discharge at any 
time and medical facilities shall comply with such requests”, did not apply because “Xu 
was involuntarily committed by his father with assistance of the neighbourhood 
committee on grounds of dangerous behaviour”, as such “leave was subject to the 
approval of his guardian”.24 Since the guardian did not consent to Xu’s discharge, the 
hospital’s refusal to Xu’s request of discharge then did not violate his right.25 Therefore 
the court of first instance held that there was no violation of Xu’s right to liberty. All of 
Xu’s claims were rejected by the court. Xu appealed against this decision. 
 
On 15 September 2015, the Shanghai No.1 Intermediate People’s Court rejected Xu’s 
appeal on the basis that the finding and application of law in the first instance was 




Based on the fact that the court attempted but failed to find a suitable person to take 
charge of Xu’s life in the community27, it can be assumed that the decision would be 
possibly different if Xu could access adequate community-based services. Having this 
in mind, the court’s decision is still questionable for its interpretation of the rules of 
involuntary inpatient treatment. It can be argued that the MHL should be amended with 
periodic reviews and an independent review body on involuntary inpatient treatment. 
It also notes that the court did not fully address the question whether Xu had the 
capacity to leave by himself without his guardian’s consent. 
 
Then, a brief analysis based on the CRPD will follow. It can be argued that the decision 
in the case failed to protect Xu’s right to legal capacity, liberty and community living 
under the CRPD that China ratified without reservation. 
 
A. Voluntary Inpatient Treatment in MHL 
 
The MHL introduced the principle of voluntary inpatient treatment in Article 30. Article 
30 also states “[i]f the result of the psychiatric evaluation indicates that a person has 
a severe mental disorder, the medical facility may impose inpatient treatment if the 
individual meets one of the following conditions: (1) self-harm in the immediate past 
or current risk of self-harm; (2) behaviour that harmed others or endangered the safety 
of others in the immediate past or current risk to the safety of others.” However, for 
patients harmful or dangerous to themselves, their guardians can refuse the inpatient 
treatment, while guardians of patients found harmful or dangerous to others can only 
demand a re-evaluation and a formal medical certification if they do not agree with the 
treatment. If the results of re-evaluation and medical certification favour the involuntary 
inpatient treatment, it will happen regardless of the guardian’s opinion.28 Under the 
                                                          
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 In principle, the second instance of civil cases is the last instance. See Article 10 of the Civil Procedure 
Law of People’s Republic of China. 
27 Ibid, p. 3-4. 
28 Article 31, 32, and 35 of the MHL. 
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rule of voluntary inpatient treatment, a voluntary patient can request to leave at any 
time and the hospital should allow the discharge.29 
 
The court held that Xu was hospitalised involuntarily because he was diagnosed with 
mental disorder and once injured his father in their conflict, but it seems problematic 
that Xu has to continue being involuntarily hospitalised after twelve years, especially 
considering there is no other evidence suggesting Xu has been dangerous to others 
since then. The court’s decision implies that if a person were involuntarily hospitalised 
once, he or she could be involuntarily hospitalised indefinitely.30 
 
This can be a particularly dangerous interpretation as the MHL does not set any 
specific duration, interval for re-evaluation, or independent and impartial ongoing 
review of the detention. It has been argued by Chinese psychiatrists that a similar 
safeguarding effect can be achieved by Article 44 which states “[w]hen there are 
changes in the clinical status of a patient with a mental disorder receiving inpatient 
treatment because they met conditions specified in the second clause of Article 30, 
the medical facility shall promptly arrange for registered psychiatrists to conduct an 
evaluation. When the evaluation finds that the patient no longer requires inpatient 
treatment, the medical facility shall immediately inform the patient and the 
guardians.”31 Xu’s case raises a doubt as to the effectiveness of this safeguarding 
measure. 
 
There are a number of articles addressing the inadequate safeguards in the MHL, and 
most of them propose an independent review body.32 These proposals echo some 
safeguarding standards in other jurisdictions. For example, the member states of the 
European Union were recommended to adopt safeguards on involuntary placement 
and treatment for persons with mental disorders that decisions to subject a person to 
involuntary placement or to involuntary treatment should be “taken by a court or 
another competent body” and “formally reviewed.”33 Zhao and Dawson pay particular 
emphasis on the proactive, regular and formal scrutiny and the involvement of 
experienced legal professionals and laypersons representing legal and community 
perspectives of the review body.34 However, an in-depth analysis on this issue is 
beyond the scope of this case note. For Xu’s case, it can be argued that the result 
would be different if periodic re-evaluations could be inserted into the internal 
procedure of the hospital. It is reasonable to assume that, after a period of inpatient 
treatment, Xu might be assessed as no longer with severe mental disorders or 
dangerous to himself or others and thus converted to a voluntary patient whose 
request for discharge should be complied with by the hospital. This relates to the 
“capacity to complete hospital discharge procedures” in the MHL. 
                                                          
29 Article 44 of the MHL. 
30 It is shown in the judgment that Xu’s older brother told the judge that Xu once attacked a female gate-
keeper when he attempted to escape from the hospital during the commitment. See Xu vs. the Hospital 
and his Guardian – Involuntary Inpatient Treatment, p. 4. But no evidence shows that this statement 
was confirmed by the hospital or cross-examined in the court. 
31 Michael R Phillips and others, ‘China’s New Mental Health Law: Reframing Involuntary Treatment’ 
(2013) 170 American Journal of Psychiatry, 588. 
32 Chunyan Ding, ‘Involuntary Detention and Treatment of the Mentally Ill: China’s 2012 Mental Health 
Law’ (2014) 37 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 581; Zhao and Dawson (n 1). 
33 Article 12 of the Recommendation Rec(2004)10 of the Committee of Ministers to member States 
concerning the protection of the human rights and dignity of persons with mental disorder. 
34 Zhao and Dawson (n 1) 677. 




B. Capacity to Leave Hospital or to Lead a Good Life? 
 
The hospital in Xu’s case requested his older brother to take Xu out and expressed in 
the hearing that the only obstacle to release was the guardian’s refusal. Article 45 of 
the MHL states that “[w]hen persons with mental disorders are unable to complete 
hospital discharge procedures themselves, these procedures shall be completed by 
their guardians.” Xu used it as a basis to argue that his older brother failed to do his 
duty, but the court held that it was a legitimate choice as a right of being a guardian. 
 
This relates to the ambiguous decision-making power between Xu and his guardian. 
The essence of this question lies on whether Xu had the capacity to leave the hospital 
independently. 
 
Xu was found to have limited capacity to civil conduct, which means he can 
independently make civil conduct that falls within the scope of his capacity.35 The 
court’s decision mentioned this in principle but did not give any clear finding on what 
Xu was capable of doing independently. The decision does not reflect any effort made 
by the court to identify whether a guardian was needed in this specific task: Xu’s 
discharge. 
 
It could be possibly argued that the rationale of the court in making its decision was 
that Xu lacked the capacity to take care of himself out of hospital. It is not an 
unreasonable concern, given that no community-based service and support for 
independent living was available. Yet this is not what the MHL requires to be 
considered. Instead, the MHL requires consideration of whether or not Xu had the 
capacity to “complete hospital discharge procedure by himself”. 
 
In fact, based on empirical research on the cause of long-term hospitalisation after the 
implementation of MHL in a mental health institution, 64.6% of 370 respondents who 
have been hospitalised for more than one year could not be discharged because their 
family members refused, and only 20.5% believed that they could not leave because 
of doctors’ disapproval.36 Ji and Li argue that it has been a serious issue that many 
patients who should be discharged had to be kept in hospitals because of guardians’ 
refusal.37 They propose that hospitals should allow patients disqualified to involuntary 
inpatient treatment to complete the discharge procedure independently and they call 
for guidance to be provided by relevant authorities.38 The decision in Xu’s case failed 
to bring about such a change. 
 
C. Compliance with the CRPD 
 
The previous sections critically considered the safeguards provided in the MHL. This 
section will briefly outline some of the requirements of the CRPD in relation to these 
issues.  
                                                          
35 Article 13 of the GPCL. 
36 Lixin Luo, Xiangjiao Liao, Zhimei Xie, et al., ‘The Cause of Long-term Hospitalisation after the 
Implementation of Mental Health Law’ (2014) Vol 22, No. 12, China Journal of Health Psychology 1769. 
37 Yongzhang Ji and Guohai Li, ‘Confusions and Thoughts about the Rules of Discharge in the Mental 
Health Law’ (2015) 1 Vol 26 Jiangsu Health Management 146. 
38 Ibid, 147. 




Articles 12, 14 and 19 are relevant to the case of Xu, as the decision raises significant 
concerns about Xu’s right to liberty, legal capacity and living independently and being 
included in the community. These articles, in particular, appear to have been 
compromised in the case of Xu with no remedy provided by the Chinese courts. It has 
been argued by the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(hereinafter, Committee) in the Guidelines on article 14 of the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (hereinafter, Guideline on Article 14), that these 
rights are closely interrelated and interdependent.39 The Committee’s “Concluding 
Observations” on the Initial Report of China (hereinafter, Concluding Observations) 
two years before the decision of the Xu’s case are of note. The Committee 
recommended law reforms, which included introducing positive obligations to promote 
these above-mentioned rights.40 
 
Meanwhile, the emphasis here is given to the fact that the court relied on the 
guardianship system to override Xu’s preference to leaving hospital. Article 12 of the 
CRPD requires member states to recognise that persons with disability enjoy their 
legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life and provide access 
to support in exercising their legal capacity, as well as safeguards.41 Respecting the 
will and preference is also the core of the General Comment No.1 on Equal 
Recognition before the Law (hereinafter, General Comment No.1) that interprets 
Article 12 as prohibiting substitute decision-making systems, which would include 
guardianship in Xu’s case. General Comment No. 1 states: 
 
“[t]he denial of the legal capacity of persons with disabilities and their detention in institutions 
against their will, either without their consent or with the consent of a substitute decision-maker, 
is an ongoing problem. This practice constitutes arbitrary deprivation of liberty and violates 
articles 12 and 14 of the Convention. States parties must refrain from such practices and 
establish a mechanism to review cases whereby persons with disabilities have been placed in 
a residential setting without their specific consent. ”42 
 
It has been a highly controversial question as to whether mental health legislation 
authorizing involuntary treatment and commitment is permissible under the CRPD43, 
and giving an answer to this question is far beyond the scope of this case note. 
However, unlike many debates on legal capacity and General Comment No.1, there 
was no such controversy on whether or not substitute decision-making should play the 
role as a last resort with support possibly given.44 The uncertainty in current theoretical 
debates and law reform proposals surrounding “hard cases”45 should not affect Xu 
who has no difficulty in understanding and expressing his decision and poses no more 
risk to himself or others than anyone else. The hospital also acknowledged that the 
                                                          
39 Paragraph 8 and 9 of the Guideline on Article 14. 
40 UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Concluding Observations on the Initial 
Report of China, adopted by the Committee at its eighth session (17–28 September 2012). 
41 Article 12 of the CRPD. 
42 Paragraph 40 of the General Comment No.1. 
43 See Callaghan and Ryan (n 3); Tina Minkowitz, ‘Why Mental Health Laws Contravene the CRPD-An 
Application of Article 14 with Implications for the Obligations of States Parties’ (2011) Available at, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1928600 accessed 19 December 2015. 
44 John Dawson, ‘A Realistic Approach to Assessing Mental Health Laws Compliance with the 
UNCRPD’ (2015) International Journal of Law and Psychiatry. 
45 Piers Gooding, ‘Navigating the “Flashing Amber Lights” of the Right to Legal Capacity in the Un ited 
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Responding to Major Concerns’ (2015) 
15 Human Rights Law Review 45. 
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only obstacle to his discharge was the guardian’s refusal. The court’s decision did not 
follow the CRPD even in a conservative sense, or try to respect Xu’s will and 
preference as much as possible along with the existence of the guardianship system. 
 
In addition, because China is not a member state of the Optional Protocol of CRPD, 




This case provides an insight into how the MHL is operating and how the courts have 
responded to cases such as this one. Although it is just one case, Xu’s case is 
significant in being the first case where an involuntarily hospitalised person sought 
discharge based on the new MHL. This article discussed the court’s decision with a 
critical view on its application of the principle of voluntary inpatient treatment and the 
guardian’s role. The final section offered a brief account of how Xu’s case relates to 
the CRPD, particularly noting that Xu was not among those “hard cases” in legal 
capacity-related debates. 
 
Based on the reflection of Xu’s case, the MHL could not fulfil its full potential of rights 
promotion unless a stronger safeguarding approach were adopted.46 More research 
is required to explore the necessary development and reform of the MHL and mental 
health service in the new era of the CRPD. 
                                                          
46 Shao and Xie (n 5). 
